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Schaffer: Annual Legal Update

39th ANNUAL CONFERENCE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSIONS
ANNUAL LEGAL UPDATE
Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom
Frederick P. Schaffer
I.

Secondary Materials

Frederick P. Schaffer, A Guide to Academic Freedom,
http://www.nacua.org/documents/GuideAcademicFreedom.doc or
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/vc_la/2012/01/02/a-guide-to-academic-freedom/
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, “Academic Freedom and the Public’s Right to Know: How
to Counter the Chilling Effect of FOIA Requests on Scholarship,
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Levinson__ACS_FOIA_First_Amdmt_Issue_Brief_0.pdf.

II.

Cases
A.

Free Speech – Garcetti

1. Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640
F.3d 550(4th Cir. 2011).
This is an action brought by an associate professor of criminology alleging
discrimination based on his religion and exercise of free speech rights, as well as
retaliation, in connection with the denial of his application for promotion to full
professor. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
Plaintiff’s application for promotion cited some external writings and appearances
since his religious conversion, in addition to non-refereed publications and informal
advising to Christian groups. When his application was denied, he sued. The district
court dismissed his claim of religious discrimination on the ground of insufficient
evidence and the court of appeals affirmed that holding. The district court also dismissed
his free speech claims, holding that all of plaintiff’s statements cited in his application for
promotion were made pursuant to his official duties and therefore enjoyed no First
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Amendment protection under Garcetti. The district court reasoned that when plaintiff
listed his columns, non-scholarly publications and public appearances in his application,
he implicitly acknowledged that they were made pursuant to his professional duties as a
faculty member. The court of appeals reversed on this point, holding that the district
court had misread Garcetti. The court summarized its ruling as follows:
The district court’s decision rests on several fundamental errors including
its holding that protected speech was converted into unprotected speech
based on its use after the fact. In addition, the district court applied
Garcetti without acknowledging, let along addressing, the clear language
in that opinion that cases doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis applies in
the academic context of a public university. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 425,
126 S. Ct. 1951. Nor did the district court take into consideration the only
Fourth Circuit case addressing a similar issue, Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 & n.
11 [where the court applied the Pickering-Connick standard, not Garcetti,
to a high school teacher’s speech related to classroom teaching].
640. F.3d at 561.
The court of appeals went on to hold, most significantly, that Garcetti does not
apply in the academic context of a public university under the facts of this case. Its
reasoning is worth quoting in full:
There may be instances in which a public university faculty member’s
assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering
university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching. In that
circumstance, Garcetti may apply to the specific instances of the faculty
member’s speech carrying out those duties. However, that is clearly not
the circumstance in the case at bar. Defendants agree Adams’ speech
involves scholarship and teaching; indeed,, as we discuss below, that is
one of the reasons they say Garcetti should apply – because UNCW paid
Adams to be a scholar and a teacher regardless of the setting for his work.
But the scholarship and teaching in this case, Adams’speech, was intended
for and directed at a national or international audience on issues of public
importance unrelated to any of Adams’ assigned teaching duties at UNCW
or any other terms of his employment found in the record. Defendants
concede none of Adams; speech was undertaken at the direction of
UNCW, paid for by UNCW, or had any direct application to his UNCW
duties.
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Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty
member under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First
Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor
engaged in during his employment. That would not appear to be what
Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent with our long-standing recognition
that no individual loses his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of
public employment. In light of the above factors, we will not apply
Garcetti to the circumstances of this case.
640 F.3d at 563-64. The court then went on to explicitly reject defendants’ argument that
Garcetti should apply because plaintiff’s position as an associate professor required him
to engage in scholarship, research and service to the community and that the resulting
statements were therefore pursuant to his official duties. The court quoted from both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Garcetti that its holding does not fully account for the
additional constitutional interests related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction. The court of appeals in Adams therefore concluded:
Put simply, Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct
employee duty than the general concept that professors will engage in
writing, public appearances, and service within their respective fields. For
all the reasons discussed above, that thin thread is insufficient to render
Adams’ speech “pursuant to [his] official duties: as intended by Garcetti.
640. F.3d at 564. Accordingly, the court of appeals went on to state that a review of
plaintiff’s speech must utilize “the Pickering-Connick analysis for determining whether it
was that of a public employee, speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public concern.” Id.
Its review of the record led the court to the conclusion that plaintiff’s speech was clearly
that of a citizen speaking on matters of public concern because his columns addressed
topics such as academic freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion,
homosexuality, religion and morality.
Finally, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to decide the
two issues that it had not reached: (1) whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking on matters
of public concern were outweighed by the government’s interest in providing effective
and efficient service; and (2) whether plaintiff’s speech was a substantial factor in the
decision not to promote him.
B.

Discovery of Scholarly Materials

1.
United States v. Trustees of Boston College, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2011
WL 6287967 (D. Mass., Dec. 16, 2011).
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The court denied the motions of Boston College to quash subpoenas but granted
its request for an in camera review of the responsive materials. The subpoenas were
issued by a commissioner pursuant to the United Kingdom Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty and sought confidential interviews and records from an oral history project known
as the “Belfast Project”.
The goal of the project was to document in taped interviews the recollections of
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Sinn Fein, the Ulster
Volunteer Force and other paramilitary and political organizations involved in the
“Troubles” in Northern Ireland. Boston College sponsored the Project, and its agreement
with the Project director required him, the interviewers and the interviewees to sign a
confidentiality agreement forbidding them to disclose the existence or scope of the
Project without the college’s permission. In addition, In addition, the contract also
required the adoption of a coding system to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees;
only the College Librarian and the Project Director would have access to the key. Each
interviewee was given a contract guaranteeing confidentiality “to the extent that
American law allows”.
Much of the opinion is taken up with an analysis of the Treaty and the meaning of
a federal statute called the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act. The court
concluded that under those authorities, it had discretion to review a motion to quash a
subpoena under a standard of reasonableness, while giving appropriate deference to the
compelling government interests inherent in the Treaty. Turning to the countervailing
interest in confidentiality, the court reaffirmed the prior holdings of the First Circuit,
which, almost alone among federal circuits, affords protection for confidential academic
research materials (similar to the limited protection afforded to a reporter’s materials
from a confidential source). The court recognized the significant interests on both sides - the obligations of the United States under the Treaty and the public’s interest in
legitimate criminal proceedings, on the one hand, against the Project’s interest in
confidentiality and the potential chilling effects of disclosure on academic research, on
the other. Accordingly, it denied the motion to quash but granted Boston College’s
request for an in camera reviews of the responsive materials before rendering a final
decision.
2.
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices
and Products Liability Litigation, 2011 WL 5547133 (S.D. Ill., Nov. 15, 2011).
The court denied the motion of Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals to compel
discovery of certain materials relating to the report of plaintiffs’ expert witness. (Despite
the fact that plaintiffs had withdrawn him as a testifying expert, Bayer argued that
Seventh Circuit precedent required the production.) The materials in dispute consisted of
peer review comments of published papers. The court ruled that the disclosure of peer
review comments would impose a far greater burden on the academic and scientific
community than the probative value to the defendant in this case and therefore denied the
motion to compel.
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The court’s recognition of the value of peer review is worth quoting in full:
The peer review process is vital to academic quality. In the
scientific community, peer review material identifies strengths and
weaknesses in a researcher’s material. This helps ensure integrity and
reliability in scientific activity and reporting.
The pillars of a successful peer review process are confidentiality
and anonymity; anything less discourages candid discussion and weakens
the process. Accordingly, peer review material has traditionally been
protected from public disclosure.
The court went on to rely on the decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262
(7th Cir. 1982), where the Seventh Circuit quashed a subpoena issued to university
researchers seeking research material, including research notes, reports, working papers
and raw data (but not peer reviews) relating to ongoing studies on the ground that
disclosure of such materials could interfere with the researchers’ academic freedom and
could have a chilling effect on scientific research generally. Interestingly, the court did
not cite, much less discuss, the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), holding that the EEOC did not violate
academic freedom in requiring a university to turn over confidential peer review
materials pursuant to a subpoena issued in its investigation of a discrimination claim filed
by a faculty member who had been denied tenure.
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